



Railroads-Legislative Control-Maximum Rates-Mileage Books.-
Smith v. Lake Shore &- M. S. Ry. Co., 72 N. W. Rep. 328 (Mich.). The
Constitution of Michigan (Art. ig a. q x) empowers the legislature to pass laws
establishing reasonable maximum rates for the transfer of passengers on the
railroads of the State. Having established such maximum rate, the legislature
further enacted (Pub. Acts i8gi, No. go) that the railroad companies in the
State should be required to issue iooo-mile tickets, at a specified rate, lower
than the maximum rate. The majority opinion upholding the constitutionality
of this latter enactment, cites especially Wellman v. Ry. Co., 83 Mich., at p.
624, to rebut the contention that the section of the constitution (ig a. § i) is a
limitation upon the authority of the legislature, and that the power of fixing
rates is exhausted when the maximum rates have been established. See also
In re Thirty-Fourth St. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 343. Such subsequent fixing of
different rates does not result in unjust discrimination. Interstate Commerce
Commission v. BalI. & 0. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263. Grant and Hooker, J. J.,
dissent. The affirmative grant of power to fix a maximum rate implies an
exclusion of all other powers of this nature. Story Const. § 448. It lies
within the police power to protect the general public by fixing a maximum rate
which such quasi-public corporations may charge (Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113); but to enforce the issuance of mileage tickets at certain figures on the
ground that a quantity of commodity is contracted for, is a plain abuse of the
police power, and unjust discrimination in favor of those who have the means
and opportunity of purchasing in quantity. It would be anomalous to call this
class the "general public." The argument of counsel in this case leads to the
conclusion also that the legislature may manage and control the business of the
railroads of a State just as fully and completely as it could if the State owned
them. The interstate commerce act seems to have been designed to prevent
the very thing that this law would require.
Injunction-Restraining Brokerage in Railway Tickets-Jurisdiction-
Amount in Disfiute-Princifles Governing Remedy-Novel Use of Writ.-
Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. McConnell et al., etc., 82 Fed. Rep. 65.
In order to aid in the success of the Tennessee Centehnial Exposition at
Nashville, its managers induced the leading railroads to issue at one-third the
regular rates a special contract round-trip ticket, to be used only during the
period of the Exposition, which by its terms was non-transferable, and should
become void in the hands of any third party acquiring it in violation of the
agreement. Defendants, who were "ticket scalpers" were in the habit of
buying and selling the return portions of these tickets, and a bill was brought
to restrain them from further prosecuting this particular branch of the brokers'
business, t1eld, that plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction to so restrain
defendants. The injury sustained by the railroads because of the violation of
these contracts is irreparable, for the multitude of suits necessary for redress
at law would bring absolutely no substantial result to complainants. See
Wahte v. Reinbach, 76 Ill. 322; Parker v. Woolen Co., 2 Black 55.; Wylie
v. Coxe, 13 How. 415; Sanford v. Poe, 37 U. S. App. 378. Thecase is not one
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for the recovery of damages for the numerous breaches of contract, but pro-
tection of the business of complainants from loss suffered and to be suffered by
frauds committed and to be committed. The court therefore entertained no
doubt of its jurisdiction, as the amount involved is the continuing loss to be
prevented from the fraudulent use of these void papers. Railway Co. v.
Kuteman, 54 Fed. 552; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107. A close analogy is
furnished in trade-mark and patent cases. The "age-worn" objection of
novelty is urged against the serving of the writ of injunction in this case also.
A similar objection was overruled in Toledo, A. A. &- N. M, Ry. Co. v. Penn.
Co., 54 Fed. 751, also in the famous Strike Cases, arising out of the contempt
proceedings in U. S. v. Deas, 64 Fed. 724. See also In re Debs, 158 U. S.
565; Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 MO. 212; Scott v. Donald, supra; Arthur v.
Oakes, 63 Fed 31o; Davis v. Zimmerman, 36 N. Y. Supp. 3o3, and Lumley
v. Wagner, 6 Eng. Ruling Cas. 652.
Taxation-Exemfition.-AEtna Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of City of New
York, 47 N. E. Rep. 593 (N. Y.). Laws i886 (N. Y.) whereby certain property
of insurance companies is exempted from taxation, held not to apply in that
year, the taxes having already been assessed but not actually levied. This is
so upon authority of In re American Fine Arts Society, 151 N. Y. 621, where
the act took effect on May 3d, and the assessment was made on May ist, but
not actually levied. Also in Assn. for Benefit of Colored Orfihans v. layor,
etc., of New York, IO4 N. Y. 58I, the same doctrine is applied where the
plaintiff became the owner of the property after May ist, and before the tax
was actually imposed.
Foreign Corporations-Comfiliance with Statute.-New York Nat. Build-
ing &- Loan Ass'n, v. Connor, 41 S. W. 1054 (Tenn.). Prior to the passage
of a statute describing the terms upon which a foreign corporation could do
business within the State, the defendant became a stockholder in the plaintiff
company, a foreign building and loan association, and applied for a loan
therein. After the passage of such a statute and before the plaintiff had com-
plied with its terms, the loan was made and a mortgage taken as security.
Held, that the mortgage was illegal and unenforceable, even though the bor-
rower may have acquired a vested right to the loan and the association under
obligation to make it. The making of the loan and giving the mortgage were
not merely the winding up of unfinished business.
Water Com,6anies-Condition of Furnishing Water.-Crumley v.
Watauga Water Co., 41 S. W. Rep. ios8 (Tenn.). A water company, duly
organized and chartered under a general State law and clothed with the power
of condemnation, is a quasi-public corporation and must furnish water to all
who apply therefor and tender the legal rates. Such a corporation cannot
justify its action in refusing to furnish one water on his refusal to pay a due-
bill for water furnished a year or two previously. The company had given
him its credit by accepting a duebill and could not thereafter coerce payment
by denying a present legal right.
Statutes-Sfiecial Acts-Constitutional Law-Legislative Control of
Cities.-Restrictions on Use of Profierty, City of St. Louis v. Dorr, 4r S. W.
Rep. 1o95 (Mo.). An act of the legislature of Missouri prescribed that "all
cities in the state having a population of three hundred thousand or more
* * * are hereby authorized to establish boulevards and provide
for maintaining the same * * * and may exclude the institution and
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maintenance of any business avocation on the property fronting on said boule-
vard." Pursuant to this authority the municipal assembly of St. Louis
enacted an ordinance establishing certain boulevards and forbade thereon the
following of any business avocation whatever. Held, that while such act of
the legislature was not a special act it was nevertheless in violation of the
Constitution, Art. 2 § 3o, declaring that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law. City of St. Louis v. Hill, xi6 Mo. 527, 22 S. W.
Rep. 861.
Contributory Negligence-Financial Condition of Parents-Charge to
the jury.-Fox v. Oakland Consol. St. Ry., 50 Pac. Rep. 25 (Cal.). In an
action against a street railway company for negligently causing the death of a
child, the judge of the lower court charged the jury as follows: "The fact
that plaintiff is a poor man, if that be true, constitutes no ground why he is
entitled to a verdict, but is a matter to be considered by you in determining
whether or not he has been guilty of contributory negligence." Held, errone-
ous. The courts have held differently in regard to this question, but to quote
from Mayhew v. Burns, 113 Ind 339, 340: "Whether one was negligent or
not in a given case must be determined by considering his or her conduct as it
related to the particular circumstances of the occasion or affair out of which
the case arises." In the case at bar, the contention seemed to be that plain-
tiff's poverty affected his ability to have the child properly cared for.
CONTRACTS.
IZmlied Contracts-Statute of Frauds-Rescission.-Miller v. Roberts,
47 N. E. Rep. 585 (Mass.). Plaintiff conveyed his farm at the request of the
defendant to a third person in consideration of defendant's oral promise to
convey to him another farm. Defendant, without plaintiff's consent, sold and
conveyed the farm he had agreed to convey to plaintiff to another person, thus
making it impossible for him to perform his agreement. Held, that defendant
was liable for the property conveyed by the plaintiff for his benefit, notwith-
standing the agreement by which he received it could not have been enforced
by reason of the Statute of Frauds. Where one receives money or property on
an executory contract which cannot be enforced by reason of the Statute of
Frauds, and he then refuses to perform the contract, he is liable on an implied
promise to return the money or pay for the property. Dix v. Marcy, zx6
Mass. 4x6; Root v. Burt, ix8 Mass. 521.
Delivery- What Constitutes.-Peofile's Nat. Bank v. Freeman's Nat.
Bank, 47 N. E. Rep. 588 (Mass.). Where a sealed package of papers was sent
to a collector with a draft attached for collection and with instructions to
deliver papers only upon payment of draft, a temporary surrender of the
package to the drawee for eiamination was not a "delivery" within the
instructions. The delivery contemplated by the letter of instructions was an
absolute one, and could be no other than that which was necessary to be made
upon payment of the draft, ie., a surrender of the package to the drawee as
his own property.
Life Insurance- Wager Policy.-Givens v. Veeder, So Pac. Rep. 316 (N.
M.). A assigns to B a life insurance policy for$5,ooo to secure a debt of $2,ooo,
and B afterwards pays semi-annual premiums, interest, etc., amounting to
$4,5oo at the time of the insured's death. A second creditor, C, to whom A
had assigned his title in the insurance policy, which he did not possess because
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of previous assignment, brings an action to compel B to pay the debt due to
him, C. Held, that the unconditional assignment of the policy by A to B did
not constitute a IIwager policy" or "speculative risk." This is not contrary
to Cammack v. Lewis, z5 Wallace 643, as in that case the amounts of the debt
and the assignment were disproportionate.
Rights and Liabilities of Co-Sureties.-Pile v. McCoy, 41 S. W. Rep. 1052
(Tenn.). Where one of the sureties of a guardian's bond receives the ward's
money from the guardian for his own use, in consequence of which the guar-
dian defaults, he is liable to this co-surety for the entire amount defaulted,
especially if he has indemnified himself. This is true although the co-surety
may have known and acquiesced in his receiving the money.
MINES.
Mining Claims-Location by Aliens-Subsequent Declaration of Inten-
tion.-Lone Jack Mmn. Co. v. Megginson, 82 Fed. Rep. 89. The declaration
of an intention to become a citizen by an alien who has located a mining claim
on public lands of the United States, made subsequent to his location of the
claim, relates back to the time of such location and validates it, in the absence
of intermediate adverse claims. Sec. 2319, Rev. St. declares that the mineral
lands belonging to the United States shall be dRen to "occupation and pur-
chase by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their
intention to become such." But it has been held that an alien who locates a
mining claim on public lands may hold his interest as against all the world,
except the United States. Billings v. Smelting Co., Sr Fed. 338. In Man-
uel v. Wul4, 125 U. S. 5o5, the conveyance of a claim by a qualified locator
to an alien operated to transfer the claim to the grantee, "subject to question
in regard to his citizenship by the government only." This case cited with
approval the ruling Zn re Krogstad, 4 Land Dec. Dep. Int. 564, in which it
was held that an alien having made homestead entry, and subsequently
declared his intention to become a citizen, the alienage at time of entry would
not, in the absence of an adverse claim, defeat the right of purchase. See also
Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson, zi Wheat. 332, and Osterman v. Baldwin.
6 Wall. x16, and the leading article on Mining Law in this issue of the YALE
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Mineral Lands- Tresfiass. -Lincoln Lucky Min. Co. v. Hendry, 5o Pac.
Rep. 330 (N. M.). The principle, " Cujus est solum, Aujus est usque ad
celum," applies to land in general, and it cannot be contended that the rule is
different when the lands in controversy are mineral in character, and that
while a trespasser may have such possession of the surface of the earth as
would enable him to maintain ejectment against a subsequent intruder who
entered upon the surface and ousted him, yet that such possession may be
insufficient to enable him to maintain ejectment against the same intruder if he
enter beneath the surface upon a vein of mineral-and this without reference
to the mining laws.
EVIDENCE.
Newly Discovered Evidence-Discovery of Lost Writing.-Mercer v.
King, 42 S. W. Rep. 1o6 (Ky.). The finding of a lost writing after an action
thereon, in which it was attempted to be. proved by secondary evidence and
there was a conflict of testimony as to some of its provisions, will entitle the
unsuccessful party to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
Homicide-Evidence-Testimony on Former TriaL-State v. Smith, 72
N. W. Rep. 279 (Ia.). After the shooting of S., one T. was accused of the
crime, and had a preliminary examination before a justice of the peace, at
which S. testified for the State, and identified a person other than his own wife
as his assailant. In an action against the wife for the subsequent murder of
S., it was competent for her to bring in against the State the testimony of S.
at the examination of T. Although present defendant was not a party to the
proceedings in which the testimony of her husband was given, yet S. was a
witness for present plaintiff, and the admissibility of the testimony of a
deceased witness depends in a large measure upon the right which the person
against whom it is sought to be used had to appear in the proceeding in which
it was given and cross-examine the witness. Harrison v. Charton, 42 Ia. 574;
i Greenl. Ev. P 164.
Witnesses-Impeachment.-State v. Slack, 38 Ati. Rep. 311 (Vt.). Held,
that in criminal cases a State may impeach its own witnesses. The public, in
whose interest crimes are prosecuted, are as much concerned that the innocent
should be acquitted as that the guilty should be convicted. Thus it is the duty
of the State to produce and use all witnesses within reach of process, whose
testimony will throw light upon the transaction under investigation, and aid
the jury in arriving at the truth, whether it makes for or against the accused.
State v. Magoon, 50 Vt. 333; State v. Harrison, 66 Vt. 523, 29 Art. 803. Cf.
also case preceding.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Interstate Commerce-Original Package-Liguors.-Guckenheimer et al.
v. Sellers, 83 Fed. Rep. 997 (S. C.). An original package, within the meaning
of the Interstate Commerce Act, is an unbroken package in precisely the same
condition and shape in which it was delivered to the transportation company
for carriage, whether bottle, box, barrel or 6rate. The barrels and boxes, and
not the bottles are the original packages, even where the bottles are separately
wrapped and marked "original package," but put in barrels and boxes and
shipped (Keith v. State, 91 Ala. 2). But a single bottle, however small, if
packed separately and shipped singly, may be an original package and will
receive the protection of the courts (In re Beine, 42 Fed. 546). This latter case
is at variance with Com. v. Paul, 170 Pa. St 284, and Com. v. Schallenberger,
156 Pa. St. 201, but is considered the better law.
Riparian Rights-Navigable Waters- Tresfiass-Rights of Hunters.-
Hall v. Alford, 72 N. W. Rep. 137 (Mich.). In an action for trespass for
shooting ducks by means of decoys near an island and within the channel of
the river the court held that the defendant had the right to use the waters for
the purpose of a public highway, but that he had no right to interfere with the
plaintiff's use thereof for hunting, which belonged to him as riparian owner.
As the defendant was not using the waters for the purpose of navigation and as
the rights of the riparian owner are subject only to the public use for the purpose
of navigation (Browning Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308), the actions of the defend-
ant constituted a trespass. Sterling v. Jackson, 69 Mich. 488, 37 N. W. Rep.
845.
GrandJuries-Secrecy of Proceedinks.-State v. Bowman, 38 Atl. Rep.
331 (Me.). Held, that an indictment is invalidated by the presence of an offi-
cial stenographer during the testimony of witnesses before a grand jury,
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notwithstanding he was not present at its deliberations. The investigations
and deliberations of a grand jury should be in secret, in order to secure the
utmost freedom of deliberation, expression of opinion and action among the
members. Hence the oath established by common-law usage: "The State's
counsel, your fellows' and your own you shall keep secret." The injunction
applies as well to secrets of the State, the persons accused and the witnesses
who testify to facts brought out during the examination. This, however, is
contrary to U. S. v. Simmons, 46 Fed. 65. See also Courtney v. State, 5
Ind. App. 356, 32 N. E. 335.
Wills- Validity-Provision.-Cruger v. Phelfs, 47 N. Y. Supp. 6z. A
condition in the will of an American citizen residing abroad, by which testator's
daughter forfeits her right to the income of the residuary estate, in case she
resides or travels outside the continent of Europe, which condition is expressly
limited to the life-time of the husband, or "until she shall be divorced from
him a vinculo matrimoniZ, and remain so divorced from him," is a direct in-
ducement to the daughter to procure such divorce, and is void as against pub-
lic policy and good morals. White v. Snyder, 8 N. Y. Supp. iig; Potter v.
McAlp*ine, 3 Dem. Sen. xo8.
Contemt- What Constitutes-ewsp5afier Articles-Reflections on
judge.-State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circuit Court of Eau Claire
County et al., 72 N. W. Rep. 193 (Wis.). Articles written by a lawyer and
charging a judge of the circuit court, who was a candidate for re-election with
dishonesty and partiality in the trial of cases already disposed of were pub
lished in a newspaper which opposed the judge's candidacy for re-election.
These articles were widely circulated and delivered by various parties to the
officers and jurors of the court over which the judge presided while it was in
session. The judge instituted proceedings against the author and publisher
and was about to have them committed for contempt. During these proceed-
ings an affidavit was filed alleging the truth of the articles, which affidavit was
claimed by the judge to constitute a new and independent contempt, com-
mitted in the actual presence of the court. In an action on a writ of prohibition
to restrain the judge from carrying out his threat of commitment, held, that
neither the original articles nor the affidavit constituted a contempt, either at
common law, or under the State statute (Rev. St. § 2565). If any contempt
was committed it is what is known as a constructive contempt, and the cases
cited to support the contention that the present is such contempt, do so upon
the principle that libelous publications have a tendency to prejudice the course
of justice in the particular case then pending. Seuroc's Case, 48 N. H. 428;
State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416; Peopble v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; In re Cheese-
man (N. J. Sup.), 6 AUt. 513. But several cases hold directly that such articles,
even when referring to acts of court in actions already ended, constitute con-
tempt. State v. Morrill, i6 Ark. 384; Dandridge's Case, 2 Va. Cas. 409;
In re Chadwick (Mich.), 67 N. W. 1071. In England the mere writing con-
temptuously of a superior court or judge has been declared a constructive
contempt at common law, 4 Bl. Comm. 285; but such power in a court has
never been adopted as part of the common law of Wisconsin. As the original
publication was not a contempt, the attempt to punish it was an excess of
jurisdiction of the court, and the defendants had a right, when summoned into
court, to allege its truth. In no sense could they be held to have committed a
new contempt in so doing.
